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Executive Summary 
 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, new legislation and regulation have pressured banks (and 
insurances) to reduce their size, leverage, and riskier lines of business in order to avoid another too-big-
to-fail debacle. Nonbank financial intermediaries have naturally taken up some of that slack and, not 
surprisingly, regulatory scrutiny has turned toward these intermediaries to evaluate whether they could 
pose similar risks to financial stability that banks did pre-crisis. 
 
Owing to their stunning growth in the past decade, focus among nonbank intermediaries is now 
centering on asset managers, which include firms offering mutual funds, exchange-traded funds, hedge 
funds and private equity funds. This report explores whether there is a demonstrable link between the 
asset management industry and systemic risk.  
 
Key points: 
 
 Systemic risk is distinct from run-of-the-mill financial or operational risk, an important difference 
when determining whether the sector poses a risk to the broader financial system with the 
potential for negative spillovers into the real economy. 
 
 Because asset managers do not take on nearly the same level of leverage and do not guarantee 
balances on customer accounts as banks do with deposits, it is unlikely that the industry is the 
epicenter of (or creating) systemic risk in the financial system. Theoretically, however, they hold 
the potential transmit or amplify systemic risk in the system based on unique risk factors such as 
herding and liquidity mismatches.  
 
 One major regulatory concern is the mismatch between asset management firms offering 
investors highly liquid investment terms for funds investing in highly illiquid assets, which could 
create fire sale scenarios that negatively impact financial markets. A close look at the role of 
high-yield debt markets suggests that major disruptions to the sector’s funding environment 
could have a significant impact on the real economy. However, even during periods of acute 
investor outflows, high-yield mutual funds have managed liquidity risk effectively to-date, and 
high-yield ETFs have actually been a supplemental liquidity source for institutional investors.  
 
 In a post-crisis world, regulators have as much power (if not more) than financial firms’ 
shareholders. Using this power wisely to simplify rules and minimize complex regulatory 
changes to the financial system may be the best way to achieve long-term financial stability. 
Considerations must include: 
i. The dynamic relationship between financial regulation and financial activity – rules must be 
targeted sufficiently to strengthen resilience of the desirable economic functions (such as 
lending to firms), but simplified enough to limit regulatory avoidance. 
ii. The necessity of proper fiscal and monetary policies to complement prudential oversight – no 
amount of asset management oversight can prevent investors from reaching for yield in 
response to extraordinarily low interest rates to meet their investment goals. 
iii. The reality that financial markets are connected globally – domestic oversight without 
internationally coordinated policies leaves marked gaps susceptible to opportunism and 
regulatory arbitrage. 
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I. Introduction 
Despite the fact that the better part of a decade has passed since the global financial crisis up ended what 
was described as the Great Moderation and the Goldilocks economy, participants and regulators of the 
financial system are still grappling with how best to prepare and guard against another episode of systemic 
risk. While it is generally acknowledged that regulators and government officials were at their best in 
preventing a massive disorderly deleveraging of the financial system, their subsequent efforts to 
strengthen the system against further shocks have been frequently criticized. Officials in countries 
throughout the world have enacted new laws and regulations and set up new institutions to address 
perceived weaknesses in the financial system. International institutions, like the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the Financial Stability Board (FSB), and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), have 
provided their services to collect and analyze data, as well as to coordinate action to put policies in place 
that cut across national boundaries.  
In the United States, the most visible response to the global financial crisis has been the enactment of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which represents the most comprehensive 
financial regulatory reforms put in place since the Great Depression. The Dodd-Frank law implements 
changes that, among other things, affect the oversight and supervision of financial institutions, provide 
                                                          
2 Corresponding author: Claude Lopez, clopez@milkeninstitute.org 
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for a new resolution procedure for large financial companies, introduce more stringent regulatory capital 
requirements, and effect significant changes in the regulation of over-the-counter derivatives and 
securitization market. Lopez et al. (2016) provides an overview of Dodd-Frank, contrasting its main goals 
with its achievements.    
Several new institutions have been created under the law with varying responsibilities. An independent 
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection has been set up to implement and enforce compliance with 
consumer financial laws. A Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) is now in place to oversee financial 
institutions. The Council is charged with identifying risks to U.S. financial stability that could arise from 
ongoing activities of large, interconnected financial companies, as well as from outside the financial 
services marketplace. FSOC is also responsible for promoting market discipline by eliminating 
expectations of government bailouts. Among its long list of duties, the Council is tasked with 
recommending heightened prudential standards for nonbank financial companies and large, 
interconnected bank holding companies supervised by the Federal Reserve.    
In addition to the enactment of new laws and the establishment of new institutions, officials also have 
begun to employ a variety of policy tools to tackle systemic risk. Macroprudential policies have gained the 
most attention. Extensive research by the Milken Institute details the evolution of macroprudential 
policies across emerging Asia and Europe and highlights the difficulties of these policies gaining traction 
in the United States.3 This analysis points to the need for precise timing of action and for appropriate 
monetary policy to be in place in order for macroprudential policy to be effective.  
Although macroprudential policy is now seen in many quarters as an essential tool in the effort to mitigate 
and reduce the susceptibility of the financial system to systemic risk, its application has been almost 
exclusively focused on the banking sector. In the estimation of policy makers and regulators, this has left 
much of the remainder of the financial system exposed to possible systemic risk. A number of measures 
have been put forth to deal with the perceived vulnerabilities, including identifying certain non-bank 
financial firms as Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs), which subjects them to extra 
regulatory scrutiny and rules. In addition, specific rules and regulations are being considered for the 
operation of asset managers, insurance companies and other nonbank entities.  
As might be expected, many senior executives in nonbank financial firms have expressed doubt about the 
need for many of the rules and regulations being proposed or already enacted by Congress and the U.S. 
                                                          
3 Lopez et al.(2015a) and (2015b) 
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regulatory community. Indeed, legal action has been taken against regulators in their attempt to impose 
the SIFI designation on MetLife Insurance. The court overturned regulators’ determination that distress 
at MetLife could put the U.S. economy at risk. The judge took regulators to task for an “unreasonable” 
decision that didn’t consider potential costs and relied on a process that was “fatally flawed.”  
The U.S. administration has appealed the ruling. As a further decision is awaited, the debate will continue 
about the need for measures to inoculate the nonbank financial sector against potential situations that 
could result in systemic risk. 
The purpose of this report is to analyze and assess in what ways the asset management industry might 
act as a catalyst or contributor to systemic risk. The report looks at the structure of the industry and its 
role as fiduciary agents for clients. Factors commonly associated with systemic risk, like illiquidity and 
herding, are examined. Stress tests and other measures are discussed as representing best practices in 
reducing risks. Although a definitive determination of whether or not the asset management industry, 
and its largest firms, could be deemed sources of systemic risk is beyond the scope of this report, the 
analysis can nevertheless serve to stimulate an informative dialogue between regulators and practitioners 
in the industry. 
We will proceed as follows. Section 2 recalls the definition of financial stability and systemic risk before 
turning to the risks specific to the asset management sector that are of concern from a macroprudential 
perspective. Section 3 discusses the pertinence of the current framework in regulating asset managers 
from a financial stability perspective. Section 4 explores the necessity of such a role, highlighting the 
differentiating factors between traditional targets of macroprudentialism (banks) and asset managers. 
Section 5 concludes. 
II. Systemic Risk and Asset Management Industry 
The bulk of literature and regulatory focus on systemic risk in the financial system has centered on the 
banking system. There are parallels between banks and asset managers, especially when referring to the 
broad notion of what systemic risk and financial stability mean to the industry, as we will discuss. 
Fundamentally, however, the asset management industry as a whole and its subsectors are entirely 
different from the banking system and perform vastly different roles. As a result, they do not present 
the same risks as banks. Yet, as discussed in FSCO (2016) and FSB (2016), they might possess other 
dynamics that could contribute to the transmission of – or even amplification of – systemic risk. Next, 
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we explore these dynamics and take a close look at high-yield debt funds to investigate whether concern 
about destabilizing spillovers from asset managers to the real economy are justified. 
a. Systemic Risk and Financial Stability  
Financial reforms following the 2007-08 financial crisis focus on financial stability and systemic risk 
mitigation. While these two notions play a key role in the current regulatory environment, defining them 
in a tractable, time sensitive, and relevant manner remains a challenge. 
Financial stability is often defined in terms of “its ability to facilitate and enhance economic processes, 
manage risks, and absorb shocks”.4 It is worth emphasizing that such a definition does not imply protecting 
badly run firms, nor creating a risk free environment. It is a complex topic and ensuring it is not an easy 
task as it requires identifying commonly agreed objectives as well as their unintended consequences 
across regulators, firms and clients/investors.  
Conceptually, once agreed upon, these financial stability objectives should be used to define, measure 
and monitor the aspects of systemic risk deemed pertinent and “anticipatable”.5 Ultimately, the relevant 
mix of macro and micro prudential tools should be used to mitigate it. Unfortunately, there are no hard 
boundaries between systemic and non-systemic risk, and the ever evolving financial landscape requires 
regular assessment of both objectives and how to achieve them. In other words, monitoring systemic risk 
and operationalizing a policy response remain a challenge as the risk cannot be directly observed, only its 
outcome.  
  
                                                          
4 Shinasi (2014)  
5 Systemic risk is usually defined as a ‘‘risk of disruption to financial services that is caused by an impairment of all or parts of 
the financial system and has the potential to have serious negative consequences for the real economy’’ (IMF, FSB, BIS). Yet, 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) suggest that more than 50% of the financial crises come for the real side of the economy. 
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Figure 1: US Financial Assets by Industry 
  
Source: Federal Reserve, authors’ calculations 
Besides the importance of banks and insurance companies, the 2007-08 crisis highlighted the increasing 
reliance of large firms and institutions on non-banks to cover their short-term funding needs.  
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Figure 1 shows the growing importance of non-bank institutions (asset managers and other finance 
companies) in the functioning of US markets: asset managers oversee nearly a quarter of domestic 
financial assets, up from less than 3 percent of domestic financial assets in 1980.  
b. Asset Management Industry: a Segmented Industry 
Broadly defined, asset managers provide investment services as fiduciary agents for their clients, using a 
wide variety of specific asset management models. A summary of the major fund families’ characteristics 
and risk profile can be found in Appendix 1.They complement existing financial players in their function: 
Figure 2 illustrates how  they service households, business firms and governments, but also the other 
categories of financial intermediaries, including banks, pension funds and insurance companies. 
Figure 2: Flow of Funds in the Financial System 
 
 
Source: Delbecque (2012) 
The US landscape of financial markets has changed significantly over the past 35 years: Figure  reports a 
rapid growth of mutual funds, hedge funds, money market and exchange traded funds (ETFs). More 
specifically, domestic mutual fund assets exceeded $13 trillion in 2015, while ETFs have emerged as a 
multi-trillion-dollar industry with assets growing by roughly 20 percent per year in the last decade.   
8 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 3: Total U.S. Financial Assets of Asset Managers 
 
Source: BarclayHedge, Federal Reserve and authors’ calculation.  
 
Overall, asset managers are engaged in activities occurring either at the management company level or 
at the fund level. Management company activities include administration, centralized execution of trades, 
risk management, and market research, while fund level activities include overall asset allocation, 
selection of specific securities, and liquidity management. Fund shareholders receive any profits or losses 
while the asset managers’ primary source of revenue is from fees for services.6 Furthermore, the 
separation between the custody and the management of assets protect investors from the risk of default 
of the asset manager.  
c. From Financial to Systemic Risks  
Basel III framework identifies two dimensions across which financial agents create or amplify systemic 
risk: either through exacerbating the extremes of the financial cycle (procyclical risk) or increasing 
fragility across financial sectors or institutions (contagion risk). Activities and incentives built-in to the 
asset management industry could transmit or potentially amplify risk across both these dimensions. 
Theoretically, asset managers do not face the same risks as banks and insurers except for operational 
risks. Yet, their fiduciary obligation exposes them to some financial risks. As a result, the question is 
                                                          
6 Private funds, such as hedge funds, are a partial exception to this rule, as they are not subject to restrictions on receiving 
performance fees, which gives the management company a direct stake in the performance of the funds. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Mutual funds Hedge Funds Money market ETFs
Trillions
9 | P a g e  
 
whether the individual risks can become systemic and via which channels. This section provides a closer 
look at two types of risks that stand out specific to asset managers, particularly among the plain “vanilla” 
investment funds such as mutual funds or ETFs: herding and liquidity risks. 
i. Herding and Procyclical Risk 
The fund management industry has traditionally operated with fund managers actively selecting 
securities on behalf of their investors. Competing for additional clients and client retention based on 
relative performance, fund managers are measured against a comparable benchmark. For portfolio 
managers that are risk-averse or face career risk when falling in a lower percentile of performance, 
incentives exist to “herd” into similar positions as their peers and not stray too far from benchmarks7.  
This can create strong disincentives for a manager to take countercyclical positions, resulting in “chasing 
yield” during upswings in the financial cycle and herding to sell financial positions during cycle 
downswings, thus exacerbating financial bubbles and the devastation of their fallout8.  The IMF’s recent 
Global Financial Stability Report finds U.S. mutual funds now exhibit significantly more herding behavior 
than in 2009 after the crisis.9 
It is unclear to what extent these herding dynamics contribute to financial bubbles, or whether they are 
merely symptomatic. Equally unclear is what – if anything – can be done to mitigate these potentially 
destabilizing incentives. Both retail and institutional end investors appear to be moving toward cutting 
active managers out of the investment process and self-directing investment decisions using passive 
indexes (see Figure 4).  
                                                          
7 Naik and Maug (2011)  
8 Feroli et al. (2014)    
9 IMF(2015) 
10 | P a g e  
 
Figure 4: U.S. Fund Cumulative Flows 
 
Source: Morningstar. 
Note: Cumulative flows from Jan 2013 – Apr 2016 for U.S. open-end funds excluding money market and funds of funds. 
The rise of passively managed funds – those that track indexes without fund managers actively selecting 
securities – introduces new potential consequences for the financial cycle and stability. The majority of 
passive funds buy or sell securities based on the market capitalization weights of their respective 
indexes. This can lead to a “momentum bias” where fund managers must buy (sell) the fastest-
appreciating (depreciating) index constituents, again exacerbating the highs and lows of financial asset 
price cycles.10  
While it is generally accepted in the literature and the industry that limits to arbitrage exist that could 
lead to unconstrained asset price bubbles, it is less obvious that anything could reasonably be done to 
mitigate these unmeasurable impacts. Potential reforms such as introducing alternative benchmarks or 
altering investor-manager contract designs with stronger emphasis on long-term performance appraisal 
are unlikely to be adopted by the industry en masse and would be difficult to enforce on a regulatory 
basis. Regulatory attention is instead primarily turning toward the other major perceived risk emerging 
from the asset management industry: liquidity mismatches in investment funds. 
                                                          
10 Jones (2015)  
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ii. Liquidity and Contagion Risk 
The implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act following the financial crisis placed greater constraints on 
the ability of banks and dealers to engage in various risky activities, including warehousing bond risk on 
their inventory (see Figure 5). The result has been a sharp decline in ability of dealers to offer two-way 
quotes (an offer to buy or sell a given security). While bonds have always been more difficult to trade 
compared to equities given their size and lack of standardized exchange, the diminishing role of dealers 
in the bond market has led many fund managers to complain that bonds – corporate bonds in particular 
– have become increasingly illiquid. 
Figure 5: Share of Corporate and Foreign Bonds Owned 
 
Source: Federal Reserve. 
Note: Asset managers include closed-end funds, ETFs, mutual (including money market) funds, and REITs. 
This refers to market liquidity: the ability to trade securities without creating adverse price movements. 
As bond market liquidity has declined and broker-dealer bond inventories have declined, investment 
funds’ ownership of corporate debt securities has risen substantially, in part displacing previous broker 
inventories but also in response to greater demand for corporate bond mutual funds and exchange-
traded funds (ETFs). Notably, as sluggish global growth and easy monetary policies have pushed interest 
rates to new lows not witnessed in recent decades, there has been increased appetite for higher yielding 
bonds such as emerging market bonds, leveraged loan funds, and domestic high-yield corporate bonds.  
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While many of these higher yielding securities have grown increasingly illiquid (and owe part of that 
additional yield to the illiquidity factor), the proliferation of mutual funds and ETFs providing exposure 
to these securities continue to offer end-investors very liquid redemption terms: investors can easily buy 
and sell the funds on a daily basis without meaningful gates or fees. This contrast between highly liquid 
redemption terms and illiquid underlying securities that the funds invest in creates a liquidity mismatch, 
which is a concern for regulators and many in the industry.  
Liquidity mismatches on a large scale are of concern to financial stability monitors due to their ability – 
in a worst case scenario – to cause a “death spiral” of mass investor redemptions causing fire sale asset 
prices, which leads to further investor withdrawals. Studies find that funds investing in less liquid 
corporate bonds experience disproportionately high outflows in response to bad performance11, and 
that these outflows can create destabilizing financial shocks even in the absence of significant leverage 
or actions by leveraged intermediaries.12 Manconi et al. (2012) find funds holding illiquid bonds during 
the market turmoil of the global financial crisis were forced to sell higher-quality investment grade 
bonds to raise cash, thus “propagating the crisis” across the entire corporate bond sector, suggesting 
the potential for cross-sector contagion. 
To some extent, this fire-sale scenario is analogous to countless historical examples of bank runs where 
depositors rush to withdraw their funds before the bank runs out of money, or more recently the 
“breaking of the buck” in money market mutual funds that sparked extreme fears in the aftermath of 
Lehman Brothers’ collapse. Unlike banks or money market funds, investment funds do not guarantee 
investor balances; rather, they float with the net asset value that provides an up-to-date cash value of 
the fund’s underlying investments. Nonetheless, they can still be vulnerable to redemption runs when 
investors have a “first-mover advantage” as is the case with mutual funds. In mutual funds, redemptions 
cause expenses to the funds that are not experienced by redeeming investors but are instead passed on 
to future NAV values that negatively impact continuing fund holders.  
The high-yield debt sector, especially mutual funds and exchange-traded funds, can provides useful 
insights on how major disruptions to the sector’s funding environment could have a significant impact on 
the real economy. This sector finances a number of mid-sized companies and benefited greatly from 
investment fund flows in the years following the financial crisis. 
                                                          
11 Goldstein et al. (2016)  
12 Feroli et al. (2014) 
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iii. High Yield Focus.  
As the largest investable class of illiquid securities, high-yield corporate bond funds take center stage in 
concerns of liquidity mismatches causing destabilizing spillovers into the real economy. Since 2010, high- 
yield bonds have provided debt financing of over $2 trillion to a wide array of companies from virtually all 
major industries, from energy to health care to technology (see Figure 6). Significant disruptions to these 
companies’ ability to raise new capital or roll over existing debt would doubtlessly create serious knock-on 
effects for the U.S. economy. 
Figure 6: High-Yield Debt Issuance by Industry, 2010 - 2015 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg. 
Dedicated high-yield mutual funds and ETFs have grown substantially since the financial crisis (see 
Figure 7). U.S. fund assets increased from less than $100 billion at the beginning of 2009 to nearly $300 
billion by 2014. At the same time, global net assets of dedicated high-yield funds exceeded $700 billion, 
more than double the amount just three years earlier. However, investor flows into these funds have 
become more volatile in recent years as the performance of the asset class has dwindled and major 
events such as the “Taper Tantrum”13 of 2013 and oil crash in 2015 incited fear in debt markets. 
 
                                                          
13 In the summer of 2013, the Federal Reserve signaled it could raise interest rates at a faster pace than market participants had 
anticipated, causing heightened price volatility in financial markets.  
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Figure 7: U.S. High-Yield Quarterly Fund Flows 
 
Source: Morningstar. 
Note: Net flow estimates for open-end mutual funds and ETFs. 
These periods of increased investment flow volatility (especially disproportionately large negative flows) 
raise concerns that prolonged outflows from high-yield funds could adversely impact the high-yield 
sector and create ripple effects across these financial sectors that disrupt funding for mid-sized 
businesses. Market observers – from regulators to concerned participants – fear a distressed fire-sale 
scenario in which investor withdrawal requests exceed cash in the portfolio, thus causing portfolio 
managers to sell off existing fund investments to raise the necessary cash. If other buyers (hedge funds, 
insurance or pension funds) fail to step in to support the market, a destabilizing feedback loop of fund 
redemptions and funds liquidating debt investments could take effect. The current breakdown of high-
yield ownership (see Figure 8) suggests that more than a third of demand for high-yield has come 
directly from investment funds, and more than one quarter from dedicated high-yield mutual funds. 
Insurance companies and pension funds, meanwhile, make up more than half of ownership.  
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Figure 8: Owners of High-Yield, 2015 
 
Source: JPMorgan. 
It is difficult to determine whether fears of high-yield fire-sales and death spirals are justified or fear-
mongering: one bothersome characteristic of systemic risk is the inability to precisely measure the 
likelihood of systemic events. The previous global financial crisis was precipitated in part by the 
extrapolation of historical housing returns and underestimating or ignoring the catastrophic “fat tail” of 
the risk distribution. Nonetheless, the best guess at what would happen in the event of a major episode 
of high-yield outflows may be seen by observing recent history to determine how funds have managed 
periods of distress and acute fund outflows until now.   
Mutual funds are the primary focus for fund liquidity concerns in the high-yield space for two key 
reasons: 
1. Mutual funds are the largest holders of high-yield bonds among asset management funds, with 
U.S. high-yield dedicated mutual funds holding $247 billion in net assets as of April 2016, 
compared to $41 billion in net assets for high-yield ETFs. 
2. Most mutual funds offer daily liquidity in the sense that investors can redeem shares and 
receive the net asset value (NAV) of the fund at the end of the day. This ignores potential 
administrative costs of the fund, including executing the sale of fund assets, which creates the 
potential for a “first-mover advantage” that benefits early fund redeemers and penalizes later 
redemptions. This dynamic is not dissimilar from the incentives facing depositors in a bank run, 
thus heightening fears of distress in the sector.  
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One reason net fund flows appear more volatile in recent years is the sheer size of high-yield funds have 
increased. When normalized by net assets, monthly U.S. high-yield fund flows were quite stable in the 
ten year period beginning in 2007, characterized by frequent net inflows and punctuated by brief net 
outflows during periods of financial stress (see Figure 9). The Euro-zone crisis in 2011 and Taper 
Tantrum in 2013 were the only months experiencing outflows in excess of 3 percent of overall net assets 
for the sector. 
Figure 9:  Monthly High-Yield Flows as Percentage of Net Assets 
 
Sources: Morningstar, authors‘ calculations. 
Zooming in on a fund-level we observe the number of funds experiencing large investor withdrawals 
relative to the size of the fund. Figure 10 shows the proportion of funds experiencing fund outflows in 
excess of 5, 10, and 25 percent of the starting month’s net assets. Even in the most stressful periods to 
date, less than 2 percent of funds experienced monthly outflows in excess of 25 percent of starting fund 
assets.  
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Figure 10: High-Yield Mutual Fund Net Flows as Percentage of Net Assets 
 
Source: Morningstar, authors’ calculations. 
Note: Calculated using net outflows divided by previous month’s ending net assets. 
 
On a handful of occasions, more than 20 percent of high-yield funds experienced outflows in excess of 5 
percent of starting assets. Outflows at these levels are less concerning, as portfolio managers are 
experienced in liquidity risk management and can draw on cash reserves or lines of credit to manage 
investor redemptions without disruptions to existing investments that they want to retain. Figure 11 
shows mutual fund portfolio allocations to cash by fund type, illustrating the built-in cash cushion high-
yield fund managers keep on hand that reflect the more volatile liquidity environment compared to 
equity funds. More than half of high-yield funds report keeping more than 5 percent of fund assets in 
cash. 
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Figure 11: Cash Allocations by Fund Type 
 
Sources: Morningstar, authors ‘calculations. 
 
High-yield bond exchange-traded funds are not nearly as large as mutual funds, but have experienced 
significant growth in popularity over the past decade. Starting from $30 million in assets in 2007, they 
have grown to over $40 billion in assets in April 2016 (see Figure 12). Their popularity stems from the 
liquidity benefits they provide: unlike mutual funds, ETFs are (as their name imply) traded on exchanges 
and can be bought or sold intraday.  
Figure 12: High-Yield ETF Assets 
 
Source: Morningstar. 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
< 2% 2-4% 5-9% 10-19% 20-49% 50+%
Equity funds
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
< 2% 2-4% 5-9% 10-19%20-49% 50+%
High-yield funds
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Billion US$
19 | P a g e  
 
Despite providing even greater liquidity to investors, ETFs do not necessarily present the same “first-
mover advantage” or run risks as mutual funds because buying and selling ETF shares on an exchange (in 
the secondary market) does not necessitate cash inflows or outflows from the ETF. 14 Institutional 
investors have turned to ETFs to achieve high-yield debt exposure without the illiquidity typically 
associated with holding large bond positions or even bond mutual funds.15 There is evidence that the 
largest high-yield bond ETFs have been more liquid than the underlying bonds in periods of market 
stress, and have served as a price-discovery vehicle for market participants to express their views on the 
sector.  
Indeed, Figure 13 shows that the average daily bid-ask spreads for the largest high-yield corporate bond 
exchange-traded fund have remained remarkably stable in recent years despite increasingly volatile 
daily flows. Increasing daily outflows, which reached more than 6 percent of total assets in May 2016, 
do not appear strongly related to daily liquidity or volume measures. One explanation for greater flow 
volatility may be bond dealers buying ETFs instead of the underlying bonds themselves, and redeeming 
ETF shares “in-kind” to receive the underlying (resulting in an outflow) and selling them to clients. Far 
from creating distressed runs, ETFs appear to have promoted liquidity in the underlying high-yield bonds 
and accessibility for investors. 
Figure 13: iShares iBoxx $ High Yield Corporate Bond ETF 
  
Source: Bloomberg. Note: Flows as percentage of ETF total assets. 
                                                          
14 The ETF sponsor interacts only with select large institutional “authorized participants” to create/redeem ETF units, which can 
be exchanged “in kind” for the underlying basket of securities. See Ramaswamy (2011) for further ETF structure details.  
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High-yield ETFs and – to a lesser extent – mutual funds have withstood short-term tumultuous financial 
periods from the euro zone crisis to the Taper Tantrum to the recent decline in oil prices that impacted 
high-yield energy companies. Funds’ performance to date does not guarantee they are safe from a more 
severe, prolonged downturn, but does suggest a certain level of resilience.  
III. Current US Macroprudential Policy Framework  
The initial targets of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank Act were banks or institutions presenting similar 
transmission channels in terms of systemic risk, mostly based on leverage. As discussed previously, this 
framework identifies two risk dimensions that may threaten the stability of the entire financial system: 
across institutions (contagion risk, mostly using the SIFI denomination) or across the financial cycle 
(procyclical risk). Both dimensions are closely linked and their problems often accumulate at the same 
time.16 This section compares the current framework with the risks it should be assessing.   
a. Systematically Important Financial Institution, SIFIs  
The SIFI denomination relies on the size of an institution. This proxy seems adequate when assessing the 
amplitude of risk that banks can generate to the system. By contrast, most fund managers tend to have 
simpler funding mechanisms: Figure 14 shows they incorporate little or no leverage while Table 1 
compares the potential solvency risks banks and asset managers might experience during crisis periods 
when asset prices fluctuate.17 It also shows that some asset managers are divisions of institutions already 
identified as SIFIs.  
                                                          
16 While the size of the banks’ balance sheet and degree of leverage have been identified as potential contagion risks, Shin and  
Shin (2011) and Lopez et al.(2015a) have shown that looking at the sources of funding provide information regarding procyclical 
risk; especially banks’ excessive reliance on “non-core” liabilities – short-term funding in particular.  
17 Hedge funds often make use of short-term funding arrangements and achieve leverage synthetically through the use of 
derivatives, but on average are not leveraged to the same extent as banks. 
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Figure 14: Median Leverage Ratio (2016) 
 
Sources: Bloomberg, Morningstar, Office of Financial Research, authors’ calculations. 
Note: Calculations for U.S. institutions. Average liabilities to average assets for banks, gross assets to net assets for funds. 
Table 1: Largest U.S. Banks vs. Asset Managers 
 Total Assets 
(billion) 
Financial 
leverage 
 Assets under 
management 
(billion) 
Gross fund 
leverage 
JPMorgan Chase  $        2,423  10.7 BlackRock  $        4,652  1.1 
Bank of America  $        2,185  9.2 Vanguard  $        3,148  1.1 
Wells Fargo  $        1,788  10.6 State Street Global 
Advisors* 
 $        2,448  1.0 
Citigroup  $        1,731  8.5 Fidelity Investments  $        1974  1.1 
U.S. Bancorp  $           422  10.4 BNY Mellon 
Management* 
 $        1,710  n/a 
Sources: Bloomberg, Morningstar, authors’ calculations 
Note: Bank data as of Q1 2016. AUM data estimated for end of 2015. Gross leverage calculated as gross long + gross short 
exposures of open end, closed end, exchange-traded funds and separate accounts / CITs estimated based on latest reported 
portfolio data as of June 2016. * identifies asset managers that are divisions of SIFIs (insurers or banks). 
If the definition of systemic risk focuses on the possibility of disruption to the real economy and the 
dislocation of markets, then the main concern related to the size of asset managers is the potential for 
direct wealth loss. However, this issue fades in importance when considered in conjunction with the 
interconnectedness and substitutability of an institution. Interconnectedness measures the potential of 
one firm to transmit financial distress to other firms: the more a firm is able to transmit distress, the 
greater potential impact its own distress can have.  Substitutability focuses on the critical functions 
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performed by an asset manager and the extent to which other firms could provide similar services at a 
similar price in a timely manner in the case of its failure. The asset management industry is an intensely 
competitive business with relatively low barriers to entry, hence substitutability from the perspective of 
investors in the market for investment management services is of limited concern. However, it is 
important to consider the degree to which the manager or its funds are a hard-to-replace source of 
financing for certain businesses or sectors of the economy. Due to both interconnectedness and 
substitutability, the effects of asset managers on the economy depend on the asset classes, while the 
channels of risk transmission (and their complexity) depend on the instruments used and how they are 
combined. Box 1 illustrates the difficulty of linking size and systemic risk for asset managers. 
[Insert Box 1 around here] 
b. Liquidity Risks 
The financial crisis has shown that family of funds such as money market funds could lead to a systemic 
crisis via two channels: liquidity-risk and connections between lightly regulated businesses and banks.  
As a direct response to the first issue, the SEC adopted in 2014 a set of rules, that “require a floating net 
asset value (NAV) for institutional prime money market funds, which allows the daily share prices of these 
funds to fluctuate along with changes in the market-based value of fund assets and provide non-
government money market fund boards new tools – liquidity fees and redemption gates – to address 
runs.”18 More recently, the SEC has proposed rules for mutual funds and ETFs to set up programs for 
managing liquidity risks and broaden disclosures about their liquidity and redemption practices. 
Furthermore, the Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC to run stress tests on asset managers of more than $10 
billion in assets. Since, as previously discussed, banks’ and asset managers’ business models are 
significantly different, the methodology needs to be adjusted. So far, there is no consensus on how to 
define and measure the concepts of liquidity and leverage that matter in the context of systemic risk 
buildup within the asset management industry.  
Dodd-Frank addresses the second issue by requiring standardized derivatives transactions to be centrally 
cleared. The resulting strengthening of central clearing counterparties (CCP) or clearing houses comes 
with a trade-off: it makes the credit chains more transparent, providing a foundation for centralized risk 
                                                          
18 SEC website 
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management and data processing operations. However, it also concentrates credit, liquidity, and 
operational risk within the CCPs themselves.  The CFTC is also required to implement stress tests on CCPs 
in order to monitor potential systemic risk build up, but runs into similar difficulties as the SEC. 
The challenges faced by the SEC and the CFTC led to the creation of a working group within the FSOC to 
investigate these issues, including counterparty exposures, margin investing, trading strategies and 
possible standards for measuring leverage.19 
c. Herding 
Basel III is, by design, unable to discourage herding behavior as it relies on the Asymptotic Single Risk 
Factor Model to compute capital requirements for the monitored institutions. The model assumes that all 
financial institutions have a diversified portfolio and they are all exposed to the same single risk factor. 
Wagner (2010) discusses the trade-off between ensuring that they all have the same prudent behavior, 
and encouraging heterogeneity in risk-taking: recent reforms could encourage more correlation across 
banks and financial institutions. Similar reasoning would hold for asset managers if stress tests were to 
assess their reaction to a common shock.  
IV. Is There a Need for System-wide Monitoring of Asset Management? 
The asset management industry encompasses a wide variety of business activities ranging from traditional 
asset management to alternative investing and direct lending. In other words, it is a highly segmented 
industry with little amount of information available to regulators attempting to monitor it. Little is known 
of the importance of portfolio size compared to the possibilities of non-linear and threshold effects due 
to the strategic situation of the institutions involved. Furthermore, the lack of clear regulatory leadership 
requires significant amount of coordination among the different institutions such as the SEC and CFTC to 
design a coherent body of rules.  
While asset managers have not been the primary focus of recently introduced macroprudential policy, 
they have been impacted and continue to be. Basel III, and for the US Dodd-Frank Act, moved riskier 
activities (proprietary trading) off banks onto nonbank intermediaries. New regulations are still being 
                                                          
19 UCITS and European alternative investment funds (AIFs) have been subject to such requirements and have had 
access to a range of liquidity management tools for some years. 
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implemented, including the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule and the “living wills” of large banks.20 
Furthermore, the regulatory and political momentum that followed the financial crisis is fading, leading 
to some questioning of the current framework and its potential expansion to the asset management 
industry.21 So far, regulators seem mostly focused on identifying the largest potential sources of systemic 
risk rather than the likelihood of a systemic shock originating from a specific institution.22 This approach 
captures the functional risk of banks where size is an appropriate proxy of importance when it comes to 
systemic risk. However, in the case of asset managers, it would confuse large institutions with systemically 
strategic institutions, giving wealth loss too much importance over the potential for broader economic 
disruptions and market dislocations. 
The segmentation of asset manager industry previously discussed above explains in large part the 
industry’s resilience as a whole, as well as its usefulness to the “real” economy. It is, by business design 
(low cost of entry, fiduciary activity) a dynamic industry that evolves and adjusts its strategies to new 
conditions (direct or indirect regulations, technological progress or very low interest rate) and that passes 
all asset values fluctuation to its clients. As a result, monitoring and regulating the asset management 
industry is quite challenging. One suggestion is for regulation to focus on the type of activity that provides 
an economic function and, that, if failing, would trigger systemic crises. Then the appropriate resolution 
strategies should be designed to avoid such chaos.  This approach implies an iterative process or rounds 
of communication between all parties involved (regulators, firms and their clients) in order to secure the 
buy-in of all sides. Cooperation among all parties is required to ultimately minimize unexpected 
consequences like pushing risky activities in more shadowy environment or generating unrealistic 
expectations on the part of investors. It would also reduce the risk of layers of uncoordinated regulations 
due to the numerous institutions overseeing part of a same industry. The current set up of the FSOC could 
facilitate such a process as long as it remains politically independent and a lead institution is identified to 
oversee the asset management industry. 
V. Conclusion 
The success of prudential regulation depends on several key elements. First and foremost, prudential 
policies are complements to proper macroeconomic policies (monetary, fiscal, structural) and not 
                                                          
20 The Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule is not part of the Dodd-Frank Act but an initiative competing with the SEC fiduciary 
rule. 
21 Lopez et Saeidinezhad (2016)provides an assessment of the implementation of Dodd-Frank Act. 
22 The SIFI denomination ignores whether the scenario suggested in the stress tests are likely or not. 
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substitutes. The current global monetary policy stance with pervasive low or negative interest rates and 
continued divergence among major central banks could generate financial instability that prudential 
policies would be unable to fix. Second, many financial markets and actors are international. As a result, 
successful toughening of prudential requirements requires international coordination. Yet, Frankel (2016) 
provides several explanations why such coordination remains a challenge as shown in recent G20 and G7 
summits. Third, the financial world is highly complex whether it is due to business models or extremely 
integrated activities across different industries. Therefore, it is rather unlikely that any data sets will 
provide a complete understanding or mapping of all the risk profiles. As a result, limitations should be 
clearly accounted for when designing regulations and their goals.  
Looking ahead, it will be important for political decision makers and regulators to realize that the nature 
of systemic risk will change with the evolution of the financial landscape. Already it is apparent that the 
business model of banks is in a state of flux with banks’ raison d’être in question by many. The center of 
power in finance is shifting to the buy side. As assets under management, according to some projections, 
rise toward $100 trillion by 2020, the buy side is poised to replace banks as the major source of funding 
for deals and underwriting. In the post crisis world, regulators have as much power, if not more, than 
financial firms’ shareholders. Using this power wisely to simplify rules, minimize complex regulatory 
changes to the financial system while providing the right of incentives for the private sector to adopt 
proper governance and monitoring seem the best way to achieve long-term financial stability and benefits 
to the real economy.   
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>>> Box 1:  Fund Size and Systemic Risk 
Roncalli and Weisang (2015) illustrate the difficulty of linking size and systemic risk for asset managers. 
To do so they generate an indicator, the liquidation ratio, that measures the proportion of the fund that 
can be liquidated after t trading day. This statistic depends on the size of the liquidation, the fund’s asset 
classes, its portfolio construction and the liquidation policy.  
Figure B.1 summarizes a set of simulations based on the following assumptions23  
 the asset classes and portfolio compositions duplicating those of S&P 500 Index, EUROSTOXX 50 
Index, DAX Index, NASDAQ 100 Index, MSCI EM Index, MSCI INDIA Index and MSCI EMU Small Cap 
Index, on April 30, 2015.  
 the fund sizes of $1 billion for MSCI India, $10 billion for MSCI EM, EUROSTOXX 50, DAX, MSCI EMU 
SC and $50 billion S&P 500, MSCI EM 
 the assumption that 10 percent of the average daily volume can be sold every day. 
 Figure B.1: Size and Liquidity 
 
Source: Roncalli and Weisang (2015) 
                                                          
23 We refer the reader to Roncalli and Weisang (2016) for more details and simulations. While the results reported here are 
based on a cap-weighted portfolio, the authors use other weighting schemes to illustrate the impact of portfolio construction 
on the liquidation ratio. 
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Table B.1 reports the free float market capitalization (MC) of each index as well as the ownership ratio 
by size of Assets under Management (AUM) 
Table B.1: Statistics of Ownership Ratio 
Statistics S&P 500 ES 50 DAX NASDAQ MSCI 
Emerging 
Markets 
India EMU 
Small Cap 
MC (Billion 
US$) 
18,109 2,512 1,052 4,887 4,564 381 448 
AUM 
(Billion 
US$) 
Ownership ratio (%) 
10 0.06 0.40 0.95 0.20 0.22 2.62 2.23 
50 0.28 1.99 4.75 1.02 1.10 13.12 11.16 
100 0.55 3.98 9.51 2.05 2.19 26.25 22.32 
200 1.10 7.96 19.01 4.09 4.38 52.49 44.64 
Ownership 
ratio (%) 
Maximum fund size (Billion US$) 
0.1 18 3 1 5 5 0 0 
0.5 91 13 5 24 23 2 2 
1 181 25 11 49 46 4 4 
2 362 50 21 98 91 8 9 
Source: Roncalli and Weisang (2015) 
The results show that: 
- S&P 500 based fund while being one of the largest fund (size of $50 billion) in the simulations, 
presents a better liquidity profile than smaller funds such as the one based on MSCI EM ($10 
billion) or MSCI India ($1 billion). 
- A closer look at the indexes’ capitalization provides a potential explanation: S&P 500 
capitalization is equal to $18 trillion, while it is $4 trillion for MSCI EM and $381 billion for MSCI 
India. 
- Alternatively, the lower panel of the table shows that funds based on S&P 500, MSCI EM and 
India all have an ownership ratio of 1 percent if their size is $181 billion, $46 billion and $4 
billion, respectively. 
Liquidity risks are often identified as one of the main components of systemic risk that could be linked to 
asset managers. These numerical results show that size is not an appropriate proxy of this risk. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Main Categories of Asset Managers 
 
Vehicle Features and Risk Profiles 
Open-End Mutual Fund • These funds issue “redeemable equity securities” and stand ready to buy back their shares at their current net 
asset value (NAV)—the price per share of a fund.  
• These funds invest in generally liquid publicly traded bonds and equities.  
• Many of the funds offer daily liquidity to clients, making liquidity risk the key risk for the fund.  
• In particular, some funds invest in relatively illiquid securities (for example, corporate bonds instead of equity). 
This is often referred to as “liquidity transformation” that could lead to “liquidity mismatch,” which makes the fund 
vulnerable to redemptions.  
• These funds have little leverage through borrowing, though they could be taking portfolio leverage using 
derivatives (the same applies for money market funds and exchange-traded funds, below). Although regulations 
impose caps on the use of leverage, little quantitative information is available. 
 
Money Market Fund 
(MMF) 
• These funds invest in short-term cash equivalent instruments such as commercial paper, Treasury bills, and 
certificates of deposit, and play a major role in short-term funding markets.  
• MMFs experienced major runs and liquidity distress during the global financial crisis. All U.S. MMFs offered 
constant NAV (mutual fund price per share) at $1 per share. This structure created a first-mover advantage because 
funds continued to honor the $1 per share repayment even though their actual NAV was worth less as the result of 
losses from asset-backed commercial paper, which was perceived to be liquid and safe before the crisis.  
• Constant NAV MMFs continue to exist in the United States and several other jurisdictions. 
 
Exchange-Traded Fund 
(ETF) 
• ETF shares are traded in primary and secondary markets .  
• ETF shares can be created or redeemed in the primary market between the fund and “authorized participants” 
(APs) in large units. APs are typically large securities dealers. Only primary market transactions cause fund flows to 
ETFs. The settlement between ETFs and APs are usually in kind, meaning that the exchange of ETF shares and the 
basket of securities is in line with the ETF’s investment objectives.  
• APs then trade the ETF shares in the secondary market with clients and counterparties on stock exchanges. This 
intraday trading in secondary markets provides intraday liquidity to end investors.  
• Most ETFs are index funds, tracking the performance of a specific index. 
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Hedge Fund • These funds cover a large variety of investment strategies, ranging from publicly traded equity (highly liquid 
holdings) to distressed debt vehicles and structured credit products (highly illiquid holdings). Use of leverage and 
derivatives also varies considerably depending on the strategy. Unlike mutual funds, hedge funds have no cap on 
leverage.  
• Hedge funds tend to be more nimble than mutual funds regarding their investment strategy, leading to potentially 
rapid alterations in their risk characteristics. Depending on their funding and trading strategies, there can be 
significant interconnection with other financial institutions. 
 
Private Equity Fund • Private equity is a broad term that refers to any type of equity participation in which the equity is not freely 
tradable on a public stock market, such as equities of private companies and public companies that are delisted.  
• Private equity funds often monitor and participate in managing the companies whose equity they hold. They aim 
to maximize financial returns by a sale or an initial public offering of the companies.  
• There are four main subclasses among private equity funds: (1) venture capital that invests in early-stage, high-
potential, growth startup companies; (2) buyout funds that acquire existing business units or business assets; (3) 
mezzanine funds that invest in both growth equity and the subordinate debt layer—namely, the “mezzanine” 
between senior debt and equity—of buyout transactions; and (4) distressed asset funds, which are a specialized 
segment of buyouts that target mature and distressed companies. In addition, there are real estate and 
infrastructure funds.  
• Some private equity funds could be leveraged, but they are smaller components of the private equity industry .  
• Moreover, these alternative investment vehicles offer limited liquidity to end investors, matching the funds’ long-
term investment horizon. • Contagion risks are also limited because private equity funds invest in companies not 
traded in markets 
  
Source:  IMF(2015) 
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